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1．Introduction
　It is claimed that male standard employees have up-
ward sloping age-wage profiles which are especially 
steep in Japanese large firms. This paper addresses 
how factors that link age and wages were created 
from the Second World War （in the late 1940s） to the 
1990s. In addition, other factors involved are dis-
cussed.
　Sano （1993） argued that Japanese internal labour 
markets have faced difficulties with automatic pay-in-
crease systems. She assumed that there are automatic 
pay increases. Ohashi and Teruyama （1998） have ar-
gued that workers are automatically advanced be-
cause of an egalitarian policy on the treatment of 
workers. If such statements are true, seniority is pri-
marily the reason for upward sloping age-wage pro-
files. However, Endo （1994） described how personal 
assessment （satei） is carried out in Japanese firms. 
He explained that personal assessment is similar to 
personal appraisal or merit rating in the United 
States, but differs in that it applies to all employees re-
gardless of job track or status. Thus, individualsʼ mer-
it is widely evaluated and embedded in the wage 
structure from the very beginning of careers in Japa-
nese firms. According to Endo, intense competition is 
observed even among rank-and-file workers because 
satei creates a large variance in promotion and pay. 
His view opposes the traditional view about Japanese 
firms, which are represented by Sano （1993）, and 
Ohashi and Teruyama （1998）. 
Wage systems of male standard employees in 
Japanese large firms from the late 1940s to the 1990s
Junko HARADA
1940年代後半から1990年代における 
日本の大企業男性正社員の賃金制度
原　田　順　子1
ABSTRACT
　This paper addresses how factors that link age and wages of male standard employees in Japanese large firms 
were created from the Second World War （in the late 1940s） to the 1990s. In a Japanese firm, monthly salary is the 
basic measure of pay. It is composed of base pay and a number of allowances, and this paper focuses on base pay. It is 
analysed that the influences of Densan type pay are clearly observed in shokunou shikaku seido （job-ability-grading 
system）. Moreover, it was claimed that there are external forces （government, unions） supporting upward sloping 
age-wage profiles directly and indirectly. 
要　旨
　本論文は、第二次世界大戦後（1940年代後半）から1990年代において日本の大企業男性正社員の年齢と賃金を関連
付ける要素について述べる。日本企業においては月給が賃金の基本的な尺度である。月給は基本給といくつもの手当
から成るが、本稿は基本給に焦点を当てる。電産型賃金の影響は職能資格制度のなかに明らかに観察されるといえよ
う。また、右肩上がりの賃金カーブを直接・間接に支える企業外部の力（政府、組合）についても論じる。
1　放送大学教授（「社会と産業」コース）
放送大学研究年報　第33号（2015）69-78頁
Journal of The Open University of Japan, No. 33（2015）pp. 69-78
69
原　田　順　子
2．Pay system concept
2.1　Types of pay
　In general, all standard employees are remunerated 
with monthly salary, bonuses （normally biannual）, 
payment on quitting, and fringe benefits as Figure 1 
shows.
　The monthly salary system （gekkyu-sei） is widely 
used in Japan and applies to 89.7％ of standard em-
ployees including blue-collar workers （Ministry of La-
bour, Japan, 1996）. The history of the monthly salary 
system is relatively long and it has been applied to 
both white-collar and blue-collar workers since the 
1960s （Futamura, 1997）. Blue-collar workers used to 
be paid wages, but single status was achieved due to 
labour disputes in the post-war period. In Japan, the 
monthly salary is used as the basic unit for job adver-
tisement, pay negotiations and so on. Annual salary is 
rarely the matter of negotiations, even for white-col-
lar workers, because it varies according to bonuses 
which vary by profits and the results of personal as-
sessment. 
　Monthly salary is the most common pay method for 
all types of standard employees. It is particularly com-
mon among large firms4 and applies to 96.5％ of them. 
Annual income is the total of 12 monthly salaries and 
bonuses. Thus, in this paper we ignore the other pay-
ment methods （e.g. hourly wages, daily wages or Jap-
anese-style annual salary （nenpo5））, and focus on 
monthly salary.
　Monthly salary consists of base pay and miscella-
neous allowances. There are two types of allowances 
which are related to life （e.g. allowances for depen-
dents and housing allowances） and job （e.g. overtime 
pay, sales allowances and special-job allowances）. 
The proportion of base pay averaged 93％ of monthly 
pay in the late 1990s （Roumu Gyousei Kenkyusho, 
1998a6）. Therefore, it is most important to analyse 
　In fact, typical Japanese wages consist of both merit 
and seniority. Therefore, there is the matter of bal-
ance between merit and seniority in wage determina-
tion. Sano （1993） and Ohashi and Teruyama （1998） 
argued that seniority is the principal rule in wage de-
termination, and the argument of Endo （1994） empha-
sised the importance of merit. Which view is more 
common among Japanese large firms?
　To answer this question, it is necessary to analyse 
both the basic pay concept and how it changes over 
time, namely, the rule of promotion. Moreover, it is 
important to pay attention to whether the rules of 
wages and promotion vary by career stage. Accord-
ing to the Japanese Ministry of Labour, Japan （1998）, 
wage variances within the same age cohort steadily 
rise with age. The older the cohort, the larger the 
wage variances are. The Japanese Trade Union Con-
federation also surveyed wage differentials for each 
age cohort among 20,761 workers of 1,057 member 
unions2 in 1998 （Nihon keizai shinbun, 1999）. Suppose 
the average wage is 100, the highest wage is 109.4 and 
the lowest wage is 92.0 at 30 years old, and the differ-
ential between the top and the bottom is 17.4％ . How-
ever, this differential increases to 25％ at 40 years old3 
（the highest wage being 113.9 and the lowest is 88.9）. 
　These survey results are plausible because organi-
sations normally have a pyramid shape and every-
body cannot advance at the same speed by an equal 
amount for ever. Although the average age-wage pro-
files show upward slopes, clearly seniority cannot be 
the only principle to determine the speed and amount 
of promotion and of increments in wages. Every firm 
has its own personnel system. Nevertheless, there 
should be certain wage and promotion patterns, which 
are shared by the majority of firms in Japan. The next 
section will discuss what leads to the relatively steep 
upward sloping age-wage profiles of male standard 
employees in Japanese large firms from the aspect of 
wages. 
❖  Monthly salary
               Scheduled cash earnings            Base pay & Allowances
               Unscheduled cash earnings （e.g. overtime pay）
❖  Bonuses （normally biannual）
❖  Payment on quitting
❖  Fringe beneﬁts
Figure 1　Compensation for standard employees
2　Since enterprise unionism is common in Japan, the number of member unions equals the number of firms surveyed.
3　At 35 years old, the highest wage is 110.6 and the lowest is 90.7.
4　The definition is firms with 1,000 employees or more.
5　 This is a kind of performance-related-pay with a very large part consisting of consolidated pay. It is applied mainly to managers, 
but only a few firms （1.1 ％ of firms） have introduced it （Ministry of Labour, Japan, 1996）.
70
1940 年代後半から 1990 年代における日本の大企業男性正社員の賃金制度
　Every firm has its own pay structure in Japan, but 
in terms of linkage between job grades and pay there 
are three patterns （Figure 3）. In Case 1, job grades 
overlap in terms of pay scale. Due to the overlapping, 
the top of the ladder of a low grade means a higher 
salary than the bottom of the ladder of a high grade. 
This is the most popular pattern and in 1998 applied to 
79％ of upper managers, 66％ of lower managers and 
72％ of staff in major firms （Table 1）. In contrast, 
Cases 2 and 3 do not have overlapping pay bands. 
These pay structures are less popular in Japanese 
firms. In particular, their proportions are low among 
upper managers.
　When an employee starts to work, his/her initial job 
grade and pay band within the grade is determined by 
the job track, which the person intends to follow, and 
how base pay is determined and how it changes over 
time in oneʼs career, in order to understand the pay 
system in Japan.
2.2　Job-grading system
　The job-grading system is central to the pay struc-
ture and influences not only base pay, but also bonus-
es and payment on quitting. In general, firms have job 
grades, which are linked with pay bands. Figure 2 
shows an example of job grades. Grades 1 and 2 con-
sist of ladders with three steps each, 1-1 to 1-3 and 
2-1 to 2-3, respectively. In this example, Grade 1-3 
and Grade 2-1 overlap and thus their pay is equal. 
The number of pay bands and job grades totally de-
pends on firms. Moreover, they can differ by job track 
within the same firm.
6　 This is the result of a statistical survey which was carried out in 1997 over 256 listed companies and 200 small and medium sized 
firms with 100 employees or more.
Job grade
Grade 2
Grade 1
Pay 2-3
2-2
2-11-3
1-2
1-1
Figure 2　Pay bands and job grades
Job-grade
Case 1
Pay
Case 2 Case 3
Figure 3　Linkages of pay bands and job grades
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3．History of wage systems
　As described above, the job-ability-grading system 
takes into account not only jobs, but also ability. The 
reason for emphasising ability in its name is that this 
was rather neglected before, though it was not totally 
ignored. In Japan, there are two basic concepts of pay: 
job-related wages and person-related wages. Job-re-
lated wages are paid for the value of work or ability; 
person-related wages are paid for a personʼs needs to 
survive. Due to poor living standards just after the 
Second World War, person-related wages became a 
principal factor in pay determination. The characteris-
tics of job-ability-grading system was created later.
　In 1946, the Japan Federation of Electricity Unions 
obtained a pay system which was based on standard 
living expenses. This is well-known as the Electrici-
ty-Unions-Style pay （densangata chingin or 
Densan system）, and subsequently it spread widely. 
The Densan system consisted of base pay （standard 
living expenses, ability pay with personal assessment 
and length of service pay） and regional allowances.
　According to Magota （1997）, standard living ex-
penses were the most important element and com-
prised 67％ of base pay. In addition, there was length 
of service pay （5％） and regional allowances （8％）. 
The regional allowances were city allowances to ad-
just for the high living cost in large cities and winter 
allowances to meet extra utility costs in cold regions. 
As a result, base pay was composed of: 80％ forward 
personal needs and 20％ for ability. It is notable that 
even at this time there was already ability-related 
pay with personal assessment, though the proportion 
was small.
　The standard living expenses were based on the 
minimum necessity of the energy value of food mea-
sured in calories. This basis was convincing in the late 
1940s when starvation was serious, and management 
accepted the proposal （Magota, 1997）. First, a manʼs 
necessary calories for a day was assumed to be 1584 
kcal, which was the average calorific intake in 1946. 
Secondly, the cash value of a basket of food, which 
equalled 1584 kcal, was estimated. It was divided by 
0.7 （70％）, as it was supposed that Engelʼs coefficient 
（the proportion of food in total living expenses） was 
70％ . The sum was then multiplied by the number of 
dependants.
　Since the number of dependants tends to increase 
with age, standard living expenses, which comprised 
the largest proportion of base pay, also tended to rise 
with age. In addition, length of service was taken into 
account, also closely related to age. It is noteworthy 
by school career. For example, somebody may start 
from 1-1 while another starts from 2-2 in Figure 2. In 
large Japanese firms, it is normal that most employees 
are taken directly from schools and universities. 
Therefore, they know their peer group who join the 
firm in the same year: have the same school career: 
and are in the same job grade. In this kind of peer 
group, all are placed at the same grade and receive 
the same salary at the start of their career. The status 
of their school and university is not reflected in job 
grade nor pay. This equal treatment continues for a 
number of years, and creates the notion of a peer 
group with which people are compared and evaluated. 
Aoki （1988） claimed that the job grades of Hitachi （a 
large electric/electronics manufacturer） show status 
which links with pay, but not functional demarcation. 
In general, grades “loosely” link with post, rather than 
“certainly” linking, and people in the same grade may 
have different posts （Storey et. al., 1997）. 
　The Japanese Electrical Electronic and Information 
Union （Denki Rengo） （1993） argued that an ideal 
grading system should be accompanied by objective 
and practical statements, and each grade must be de-
termined with job demarcation and individual abilities 
（i.e. whether a person gets used to the job, how much 
s/he has knowledge and skills for the job, how long s/
he has carried out the job）. However, due to the diffi-
culties in job evaluation and the lack of stipulated job 
demarcation in Japan （see for example, Aoki, 1988）, it 
is typical that individual abilities, which are difficult to 
evaluate objectively, are involved. This, and the loose 
connection with post, enables regular promotion for 
the majority of employees. Even if there is no vacant 
post, it is possible to promote employees to higher 
grades according to circumstances （Kumazawa 1997; 
Storey et. al . , 1997）. The job-grading system is 
termed job-ability-grading system （shokunou 
shikaku seido） and is shared by the great majority of 
Japanese firms today. The system was introduced be-
tween 1965 and 1975 （Kumazawa, 1997）. How were 
the characteristics of job-ability-grading system cre-
ated in Japan? To answer this question, it is necessary 
to trace the history of pay systems in post-war Japan.
Table 1　Proportions of three cases by job group
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Upper managers 79.1％ 2.3％ 18.6％
Lower managers 65.5　 5.2　 29.3　
Staff 70.5　 4.9　 26.2　
Source: Roumu Gyousei Kenkyusho （1998a）, p196
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1946, however, it was particularly shocking for work-
ers and unions who were used to automatic pay in-
creases, and they opposed job wages （Kumazawa 
1997; Iwasaki 1997）. However, management over-
came the opposition and introduced the job wage by 
modifying it. The President of Jujoseishi （a large man-
ufacturer of paper-related products） stated that the 
job wage was useful to stimulate work motivation, but 
automatic pay increases should remain to some de-
gree in order to successfully implement the job wage 
（Oyamada et. al., 1997）. In the case of Tokyo Electric-
ity, the job wage was introduced in 1955, and 80％ 
（rather than 100％） of base pay consisted of job wage 
（Oyamada et. al., 1997）. The proportion of job wage 
in base pay depended on firms. The timing of its im-
plementation also relied on firms （in the 1950s and 
1960s）. For instance, firms in electric and iron indus-
tries introduced it in the mid 1960s （Iwasaki, 1997）. It 
was an important issue especially in the early 1960s 
（Oyamada et. al., 1997）. The management attempted 
to modernise pay systems and aimed to give more im-
portance to contribution to job （Iwasaki, 1997）. But, 
ultimately, the job wage was not consolidated in Ja-
pan.
　Iwasaki （1997） argued that there were four main 
problems with the job wage. First, job wages created 
problems with the frequent job rotation/changes 
which were required in the 1960s due to rapid eco-
nomic growth. It was often necessary to rotate people 
into jobs with lower wages, and nobody was happy 
with the rotation. It was, however, difficult to arrange 
it so that wages would always rise. Therefore, there 
was a practical difficulty in terms of job rotation. Sec-
ondly, a job wage requires job evaluation, but job de-
marcation has generally been ambiguous in Japanese 
firms. Next, a job wage requires a market survey of 
comparative wage rates to be taken into consider-
ation, but such surveys did not exist in Japan. Lastly, 
a job wage has the principle of a rate for a job, and a 
contingent element, which used to be seen as a moti-
vator, was not included in the wage. Due to these 
problems, job wages did not root in Japan. As a result, 
management was concerned that job wages would not 
be the best way to stimulate work motivation, al-
though they considered that the job wage was better 
than Densan pay. Consequently, the job wage was 
modified by adding automatic pay increases and it 
thereby lost its essential principle, a rate for a job 
（Kumazawa, 1997）. The term （job wage） still re-
mains in some Japanese firms, but it is different from 
its original meaning. For instance, the job wage at Hi-
tachi is a disguised evaluation of personal attributes 
due to fluid and ambiguous job demarcation （Aoki, 
that the most influential factor in pay determination 
was the consideration of life, and not seniority （length 
of service）. Upward sloping age-wage profiles were 
not originally based on consideration of the rights of 
seniority. 
　The Densan pay system included a number of per-
son-related wage elements, such as minimum calories 
in a day, the number of dependants, length of service, 
the standard of prices and climate of regions. The phi-
losophy that wages should fulfil the minimum needs of 
life still remains in Japanese firms, though its weight 
in base pay has dramatically decreased in the 1990s. 
Therefore, when a pay system has been modified in 
Japan, it has been a central issue of discussion as to 
how to balance personal needs and contribution to a 
job.
　Firms have attempted to establish “modern” sys-
tems of job grading, job evaluation and personal as-
sessment since around 1950 （Oyamada et. al., 1997）. 
After the chaotic post-war period, firms needed to 
re-organise human resource management. Wage dif-
ferentials were minimised in the late 1940s, and man-
agement wanted to enlarge them in order to motivate 
workers. In the job-grading system of the 1950s, ini-
tial job grades were determined by school career, and 
the speed of promotion was affected mainly by school 
career, age, length of service and length of experience 
in the job. These factors have been retained until the 
1990s to some degree, but in the 1950s their influence 
was much stronger. As a result, the linkage of age and 
job grade was much closer than in the 1990s.
　The Densan pay system gradually decreased its in-
fluence. Because the economy steadily improved, the 
necessity to determine pay in relation to calories re-
quired came to be irrational. Accordingly, the contra-
dictions of the system were criticised. Why should a 
young supervisor receive a lower salary than an old 
subordinate with many children? In addition, electrici-
ty companies merged and the electricity industry 
unionsʼ federation was dismantled, thereby weaken-
ing unions （Magota, 1997）. The management consid-
ered that Densan pay was meaningful with a high in-
flation rate, but it harmed work motivation in normal 
situations because wages automatically increased 
（Oyamada et al., 1997）. 
　In the 1950s, some innovative firms started to try a 
job wage （shokumukyu）, determined by American 
style job evaluation schemes （Oyamada et. al., 1997）, 
and the Japan Federation of Employersʼ Associations 
（Nihon keizai dantai renmei） also promoted this. In 
theory, the job wage does not increase without promo-
tion, and automatic pay increases by age cannot be ex-
pected. Due to the tradition of the pay system since 
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frequent job rotation, ambiguous job demarcation and 
no market surveys of jobs. In addition, unions missed 
the automatic pay increase in Densan pay; manage-
ment was also concerned about the lack of a contin-
gent part in job wages. As a result, the job wage was 
abandoned or modified greatly until it lost its nature. 
Instead, the job-ability-grading system （shokunou 
shikaku seido） was introduced to many firms. Be-
tween 1965 and 1975, the system came to be popular 
（Kumazawa, 1997） and it became the major pay sys-
tem in Japan by 1970 （Ministry of Labour, Japan, 
1999a）. Under the job-ability-grading system, job 
grades connect loosely to posts, and this was suitable 
for frequent job rotation and ambiguous job demarca-
tion. This attribute resulted in the use of personal as-
sessment which focuses on individual abilities, which 
are difficult to evaluate objectively, and the assess-
ment often leads to automatic pay increases to many 
employees. Automatic promotion （or pay increase） 
was possible due to the loose connection between job 
grade and post.
4． External reasons for upward sloping age-
wage profiles
　As described above, upward sloping age-wage pro-
files were historically created in the postwar period of 
Japan. As a result, the concept of person-related wag-
es and allowances widespread in wage formulae in 
Japanese firms. Employees advance by age or length 
of service to some degree. These personnel practices 
pose a question as to whether external powers con-
tribute to retaining the practices still today. This sec-
tion will discuss how external powers, namely, gov-
ernment, unions and management, influence firms 
toward keeping the upward sloping age-wage pro-
files. 
4.1　Government
　In Japan, government is not directly involved in 
shaping the age-wage profiles of private firms. The 
main governmental regulation of wages concerns a 
minimum wage by region and by industry. Wages are 
generally determined between unions and manage-
ment, but the proportion of unionisation is particularly 
low in small and medium sized firms in Japan. Be-
cause the employees of these firms are relatively 
weak, the minimum wage has a significant role （Japa-
nese Electrical Electronic and Information Unions, 
1993）. The minimum wage has an indirect effect in 
determining the bottom of the wage ladder for large 
firms, but it does not influence the relationship be-
tween wages and age at all.
1988）. 
　In almost the same period, other types of pay sys-
tem were also introduced to Japanese firms, including 
shokunou shikaku seido （job-ability-grading sys-
tem） and regular merit increase （this will be dis-
cussed later） which were the most important. Some 
firms implemented job wages; others introduced 
shokunou shikaku seido （or tried both）. The grading 
systems of shokunou shikaku seido are based on 
shoku （job） and nou （ability）. The former means job 
difficulty which is assessed by experience and respon-
sibility required; the latter means the qualification and 
ability of the person who is in charge of the job. The 
job grading is the combination of both, and therefore 
the same job can be assigned to people with different 
qualifications or in different grades. As described in 
the previous section, in general, grades “loosely” link 
with post, rather than “certainly” linking, and people 
in the same grade might have different posts （Storey 
et. al., 1997）. Suppose that junior managersʼ posts are 
assigned to people with Grade 5 （a lower grade） or 6 
（a higher grade） and there are 10 posts. Under the 
job-ability grading system, there could be junior man-
agers on Grade 5 and non-managers on Grade 6. Also, 
this loose connection between grades and posts en-
ables a firm to provide many employees automatic 
promotion in relation to length of service and age by 
assuming that ability increases accordingly. If grades 
link rigorously with posts, promotion is undertaken 
only when there is a vacant post. Therefore, it is im-
possible to promote more than 10 people to Grades 5 
and 6. In contrast, with job-ability grading system, it 
is possible to have 15 people on these grades. Since 
there are 10 posts only, 5 people are not titled junior 
managers. Yet, their pay is based on job grade, and 
they do not suffer any financial disadvantages. Auto-
matic promotion can be carried out without consider-
ing the limited number of posts. However, in so far as 
firms are pyramid shaped organisations, this rule can-
not apply to all employees including executives. Thus, 
this rule does not apply to upper grades. It is argued 
that automatic promotion reflects continuing concern 
with increasing living expenses with age （Ministry of 
Labour, Japan, 1999）. It is, however, unnecessary to 
consider this point for those in the top grades, because 
their salaries are supposed to be considerably higher 
than minimum living expenses. Thus, they can sur-
vive without automatic promotion.
　In conclusion, the characteristics of the job-ability-
grading system were created in revising Densan pay 
to give more importance to merit. When Densan pay 
lost its rationale, firms attempted to implement job 
wages. However, this did not suit Japanese firms with 
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lowances must exceed average living expenses, as de-
termined by the survey of the Ministry of Labour （In-
ternational Metalworkersʼ Federation-Japan Council, 
1997）. Because the number of dependants and neces-
sary expenses increase with age, these unions effec-
tively require upward sloping age-wage profiles. 
　More explicitly, the Japanese Electrical Electronic 
and Information Unions （1993）, a member of Interna-
tional Metalworkersʼ Federation-Japan Council, has 
had a family wage principle since 1967. It has claimed 
that minimum living expenses which can sustain a 
typical family must be guaranteed, regardless of the 
type of firm or job. Figure 6 shows the Japanese Elec-
trical Electronic and Information Unionsʼ concept of 
how monthly pay should be.
　As Figure 6 shows, monthly pay is composed of 
job-related wages and person-related wages （living 
expenses pay）. Both types of pay increase with age, 
but the proportion of person-related wages decreases 
gradually. Instead, the proportion of job-related wag-
es increases with age. However, the Japanese Electri-
cal Electronic and Information Unions （1998） argued 
that pay increases in job-related wages are also neces-
sary to support rising living expenses with age, and 
that job skills must be increased with age. Conse-
quently, upward sloping age-wage profiles are an es-
sential demand from these unions. These unions at-
tempt to maintain a certain amount of guaranteed pay 
increase in both person-related wages and job-related 
wages. It is however noteworthy that the effective-
ness of this demand varies by industry. For example, 
the Japanese Electrical Electronic and Information 
Unions （1993） suggested in its 4th wage policy that the 
ideal proportions of job-related wages and person-re-
lated wages are 60％ and 40％ , respectively, at 35 
years old. However, this was only a suggestion and 
　However, the legal framework in Japan may have a 
more direct bearing. Most theories of upward sloping 
age-wage profiles emphasise their relationship with 
long tenure. As argued in the human capital theory, 
shirking theory and implicit contract theories, pay 
structures closely relate to length of tenure. Thus, if 
government affects length of tenure, it may have an 
indirect influence on upward sloping age-wage pro-
files. Koshiro （1997） argued that “life-time employ-
ment” （the custom of long tenure） is legally support-
ed in Japan. Under Japanese law, it is prohibited to 
have a labour contract beyond a year, and firms have 
the freedom of dismissal. However, cases that have 
come to court have created a social norm that firms 
must avoid dismissing particular persons if they possi-
bly can. If firms must dismiss, it has become common 
to pay top up cash on quitting and to help those dis-
missed find the next job. Large scale dismissals in de-
pressed industries are also regulated by government. 
In so far as government or the law has these positive 
influences on long tenure, there is an indirect relation-
ship between government and upward sloping age-
wage profiles.
4.2　Unions
　Most unions have a policy that wages must meet 
minimum living expenses, which increase with age. 
Thus, unions have generally pushed management to 
maintain upward sloping age-wage profiles. For in-
stance, International Metalworkersʼ Federation-Ja-
pan Council （1997） states that a typical Japanese 
wage is composed of age pay to sustain family life and 
shokunou kyu （job-grade pay） for the value of la-
bour. The former aims to establish stable lives and the 
latter is to stimulate work motivation. It is argued 
that the total of age pay, person-related wages and al-
Job-related wages
Pay
Age
Living expenses （age pay） pay
Figure 6　Ideal age-wage profiles of JEIU
Source：The Japanese Electrical Electronic and Information Unions （1993）, p9
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clearly, the activities of unions is an external force 
supporting upward sloping age-wage profiles.
4.3　Management
　Japan Federation of Employersʼ Associations, one 
of the most influential business representatives, pub-
lished an important book regarding their future man-
agement policy, Shinjidai no nihonteki keiei （Japa-
nese management in the new era） （1995）. In the 
book, Japan Federation of Employersʼ Associations ar-
gued that it is unnecessary to maintain long tenure 
and that it is necessary to alter the rules behind up-
ward sloping age-wage profiles. In a typical Japanese 
firm, there are two types of promotion, namely, pro-
motion by age/length of service and promotion by 
merit. Japan Federation of Employersʼ Associations 
emphasised that promotion by merit should be more 
important in the future. Furthermore, Japan Federa-
tion of Employersʼ Associations argues that tradition-
al pay determination must be re-examined and pro-
motion guidelines also must be revised. Management 
wants to decrease the influences of age and length of 
service on pay, and this will negatively affect upward 
sloping age-wage profiles in the future. 
4.4　 Influence of these external powers on Japanese 
age-wage profiles
　The tradition of the Japanese personnel system was 
created in the post-war period when there were cha-
otic labour disputes, and behind the system there is an 
idea that wages must meet the minimum living ex-
penses of a family. Subsequently, the Japanese econo-
my grew and starvation disappeared. Although the 
basic idea that wages must stabilise lives is alive, it is 
central to unionsʼ requests to management. In the de-
mands from unions, the idea is observed as the em-
phasis on upward sloping person-related wages and 
job-related wages. Thus, it is suggested that this tra-
dition has rooted deeply in Japanese firms and in the 
minds of Japanese workers. 
5．Conclusion
　In a Japanese firm, monthly salary is the basic mea-
sure of pay. It is composed of base pay and a number 
of allowances, and base pay is the most important fac-
tor. Therefore, this paper analysed mainly base pay. 
In base pay, the most important factor is a job grade, 
which is normally “loosely”, not tightly, linked with 
post, so that if there are no vacant posts, advance-
ment is still possible. This job grading system （job-
ability-grading system or shokunou shikaku seido） 
suits ambiguous job demarcations in Japanese firms. 
was ignored by some firms. For instance, Fujitsu （a 
member of the Japanese Electrical Electronic and In-
formation Unions） abandoned person-related wages 
in 1998 （Nihon keizai shinbun, 1998a）. Hitachi （a 
member of the Japanese Electrical Electronic and In-
formation Unions） took an initiative to reduce the pro-
portion of person-related wages from 60 ％ to 40 ％ 
from 1998 to 2001 （Nihon keizai shinbun, 1998b）. 
　In contrast, the Japan Federation of Steel Workersʼ 
Unions is more influential on its member firms. The 
author interviewed personnel officers from ABCD 
Steel （the real name is disguised）, a large steel and 
iron company, in 1998. According to the interview, all 
the major firms which belong to the Japan Federation 
of Steel Workersʼ Unions （i.e. Kawasaki Steel, NKK, 
Shinnittetsu and Sumitomo Kinzoku） have the same 
proportions of job-related wages （60％） and person-
related wages （40％） for all union members （non-
managers and lower managers）. While the propor-
tions are not a stipulated agreement, in practice all 
the major firms in the Japan Federation of Steel 
Workersʼ Unions follow the decision. The proportion 
of person-related wages had been 60％ in 1970, but it 
decreased gradually to 40％ in 1988. 
　In addition, there are unions which have promotion 
guidelines for their members. The guidelines are loose 
and implicit agreements between the management 
and the union, and not contractually stipulated. Ac-
cording to the guidelines, promotion should be carried 
out steadily. Therefore, the existence of the promo-
tion guidelines encourage upward sloping age-wage 
profiles.
　In Japan, there is enterprise-level wage bargaining 
and industry and inter-sectoral wage bargaining. The 
latter is known as the Spring Offensive （or Shunto） 
and is more influential than the former （Sako, 1997）. 
In the Spring Offensive, normally unions request a 
certain amount of pay increase which is the total of 
two types of pay increase, namely, re-writing the ta-
ble of pay scales （beisu appu） and the regular in-
crease （teiki shoukyu or teisho） which includes pro-
motion up the job ladder. Therefore, the Spring 
Offensive positively affects upward sloping age-wage 
profiles.
　Thus, unions widely assume that wages must meet 
minimum living expenses to support a family, and a 
monthly salary is composed of person-related wages 
and job-related wages. Unions focus on the propor-
tions of the two types of pay. Unions are involved in 
the proportion of person-related wages in monthly 
salary in order to protect minimum living expenses 
for a family, which increase with age. As described 
above, the power of unions varies greatly. However, 
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It became widespread between 1965 and 1975, after 
the failure of moves toward the introduction of a job 
wage.
　Base pay can be divided into person-related wages 
（e.g. age/length of service pay） and job-related wag-
es, as Whittaker （1990） pointed out. Person-related 
wages originated in Densan type pay which was 
widespread in the post war period （Magota, 1997）. 
Due to low living standards in this period, it was cru-
cial to satisfy minimum family needs （Oyamada et. 
al., 1997）. This concept has remained in Japan, and 
there are a number of cash payments which are of-
fered according to a personʼs need. Because family 
numbers and the necessary living costs tend to in-
crease with age, person-related wages are one of the 
reasons for upward sloping age-wage profiles. Age 
pay is one element of the person-related wage, and it 
also contributes to creating upward sloping age-wage 
profiles.
　Moreover, the legacy of Densan type pay is ob-
served in allowances and fringe benefits which aim to 
meet personal need regardless of status. Personal as-
sessment is reflected in bonuses, but normally the 
amount is predictable. However, bonuses play the role 
of a buffer for management due to their flexibility. 
When firms are desperate to reduce total labour costs, 
bonuses are the easiest target. Payment on quitting is 
large and increases with age. It is, therefore, consid-
ered that this is one of the reasons for long tenure in 
Japanese firms.
　Furthermore, there are external forces supporting 
upward sloping age-wage profiles directly and indi-
rectly. The government legally protects workersʼ 
rights not to be dismissed easily. In addition, govern-
ment supports long-term employment which is often 
associated with upward sloping age-wage profiles. 
Management has attempted to reduce the factors 
which create upward sloping age-wage profiles since 
the mid-1990s. However, unions try to maintain up-
ward sloping age-wage profiles because they pursue 
minimum living expenses which increase with age. 
Accordingly, the idea of living expenses and the image 
of upward sloping age-wage profiles are used to at-
tract employees. This implies that employees expect 
upward sloping age-wage profiles in general.
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